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UNUSUALLY HAZARDOUS RAILROAD CROSSINGS:
THE DUE CARE TREND
I. Introduction
Virtually every state has a statute regulating the warning devices which must
be installed at railroad crossings. Many delegate to a commissioner or board a
general power to order the construction of warning devices,' while others designate
certain types of crossings as always requiring special warnings.2 Cities and towns
are often permitted to regulate crossings within their limits.' These laws require
the installation of signs, safety gates, electric signals, or other devices to warn
motorists and pedestrians of the approach of trains.'
A frequent issue in railroad crossing accidents is whether railroads can be
found negligent for failing to provide safety devices in addition to those required
by statute. A general rule is that statutory standards are no more than minimums
which do not preclude a finding of negligence.5 Thus a driver must not only
signal his intent to turn in the manner required by statute; he must also continue
to exercise due care in making the turn.6 The early cases involving railroad
crossing accidents adopted this standard. Statutes were treated as only minimum
requirements, and railroads were held to a duty of due care.7 In these early
cases, courts stressed the speed and power of trains and the consequent hazards.'
As railroads came under greater regulation, courts hesitated to find them
negligent for failure to construct warning devices not required by statute. The
majority of courts held, as a matter of law, that a railroad cannot be found
negligent for such a failure unless there are unusual hazards at the crossing dis-
tinguishing it from the ordinary country crossing.9
A few courts made the railroad's duty of care coextensive with statutory
requirements. They held, as a matter of law, that negligence may never be
predicated upon the absence of signals or other warnings of the crossing unless
they are required by statute." These holdings have been criticized for relying
1 WASH. REv. CODE § 81.53.261 (Supp. 1973); N.Y. RAILROAD LAw § 95 (McKinney
Supp. 1973); NEv. RBv. STAT.§ 704.300 (1973) ; IND. CODE § 8-6-7.7-2 (Supp. 1974).
2 CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 7538 (West Supp. 1974).
3 Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 79.420, 77.540 (Vernon 1956); NEv. Rav. STAT. § 266.295
(1973).
4 N.J. STAT. ANN. tit. 48, ch. 12, § 54 (1969).
5 W. PROSSER, THE LAw OF TORTS 203 (4th ed. 1971).
6 Curtis v. Perry, 171 Wash. 542, 18 P.2d 840 (1933).
7 Calhoun v. Gulf C. & S.F.R.R.. 84 Tex. 226, 19 S.W. 341 (1892); Staal v. Grand
Rapids & I.R.R., 57 Mich. 239, 23 N.W. 795 (1885).
8 Note, Railroads-Precautions Act-Effect of 1959 Amendment, 28 TENN. L. Rav.
437 (1961).
9 Illinois Cent. R.R. v. House, 352 S.W.2d 819 (Ky. App. 1961).
10 Bailey v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 227 F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1955) applying New York law,
Olson v. Chicago Great Western R.R., 193 Minn. 533,259 N.W. 70 (1935); Southern Ry.
v. Akers Motor Lines, Inc., 242 N.C. 276, 89 S.l.2d 392 (1955). Akers is discussed in Note,
Torts-Railroads' Liability at Dangerous Highway Crossings-Statutory Construction of that
Duty, 41 N.C.L. Rav. 296 (1963).
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upon a dubious interpretation of legislative intent, and have generally been re-
jected by later decisions. 1
While the vast majority of states presently adhere to the unusual hazard
rule, 2 recent cases indicate a return to the due care standard. This standard is
in accord with general common law principles and modem concepts of driver
and railroad responsibility.
II. The Unusual Hazard Rule
A. A Restriction on Juries
Under the unusual hazard rule it is not enough merely to show that the
crossing is of such a nature that a reasonably prudent person would realize ad-
ditional warning devices are necessary. Before the issue of negligence is even sub-
mitted to the jury, the plaintiff must establish to the satisfaction of the court that
the crossing where the accident occurred possessed those characteristics recog-
nized as unusual hazards."3 Failure to demonstrate the presence of such char-
acteristics is adequate ground for a directed verdict in favor of the railroad;
failure to direct a verdict is reversible error.' 4
In operation, the unusual hazard rule is not a precise standard, but rather
a tool which courts use to control the proplaintiff tendencies of juries.
The question of determining when a grade crossing . .. becomes extra-
hazardous or dangerous and of such a character that the safety of the users
of the highway requires additional warning signals other than the regular
highway crossing signs, is not within the province of the jury.' 5
The rule gives railroads a decided advantage "since courts seem reluctant to hold
any situation extrahazardous or unusual."' 6
The purpose of the unusual hazard rule is to limit jury discretion. As one
advocate of the standard has said, "The view that it is entirely a question for
the jury whether the statutory signals or speed are reasonable may lead to the
extreme of requiring such caution as virtually to disrupt train service."' 7
B. Circumstances Constituting Unusual Hazards
The application of the unusual hazard rule has proven difficult. Significant
disagreements exist between states as to the application of the rule, and decisions
11 Licha v. Northern Pac. Ry., 201 Minn. 427, 276 N.W. 813 '(1937); Price v. Seaboard
Air Line R.R., 274 N.C. 32, 16 S.E.2d 590 (1968) overruling cases cited note 10 supra. Licha
is discussed at 22 Minn. L. Rev. 901 (1938).
12 Coe v. Louisville & N.R.R., 172 Ala. 115, 130 So. 2d 32 (1961).
13 See 20 OR. L. Rzv. 84, 86 (1940).
14 Kansas, 0. & G. Ry. v. Collins, 207 Old. 567, 251 P.2d 178 (1952); McQuin v.
Missouri Pac. R.R., 122 Neb. 423, 240 N.W. 515 (1932); Lacy v. New York Cent. R.R., 54
Ohio L. Abs. 417, 85 N.E.2d 540 (Ct. Common Pleas 1948).
15 Tyler v. Chicago & E.I.Ry., 241 Ind. 463, 475, 173 N.E.2d 314, 319-20 (1961).
16 Supra note 13, at 85.
17 37 YALE L. J. 997, 998 '(1928).
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within states are often confusing.'" In determining the presence of an unusual
hazard, courts have considered factors such as the ease with which travelers can
detect the approach of a train at a crossing, and the amount and character of
train and car traffic over the crossing.'
Obstructions of vision which make a crossing difficult to detect include the
presence of train cars near the crossing hiding the approach of trains on other
tracks, bushes or buildings near the crossing, and the acuteness of the angle at
which the highway and track intersect. Some courts distinguish between urban
and rural crossings, holding that obstructions not on the railroad's right-of-way
are not unusually hazardous if the crossing is in a rural area.2" However, such
obstructions may be held to create an unusual hazard at an urban crossing."
Though adverse weather conditions may obscure visibility, courts have been
reluctant to hold railroads negligent for not anticipating and providing for
relatively transitory weather conditions. Thus rain, snow, or fog will not alone
make a crossing unusually hazardous,22 but weather may be considered as a
factor where other circumstances are also present."
A train blocking a crossing has been held not to be an unusual hazard.
Courts have reasoned that the very presence of the train on the track is sufficient
warning to motorists keeping proper watch.24 Consequently, some states hold as
a matter of law that when a car collides with a train already occupying a crossing,
the driver can never recover. 5 However, the majority of states permit recovery if
the crossing is shown to have been unusually hazardous.6 Nevertheless the
difficulty of recovery is demonstrated by the fact that in approximately half of
such cases decided between 1946 and 1962, the courts have directed verdicts for
the railroads."
The frequency with which cars, trains and pedestrians use a crossing is
generally considered relevant in determining whether a crossing presents an
unusual hazard.' A few states require a showing that the amount of traffic had
some effect in causing the injury." Some courts have used the Peabody-Dimmick
formula which state and federal highway departments employ to determine
priorities in funding crossing repairs. This formula is a statistical correlation,
based upon 3,563 accidents, relating the amount of car and train traffic to the
number of accidents associated with crossings using particular types of warning
18 Contrast the applications of the unusual hazard rule in Ohio, Texas and Montana as
described, respectively, in Comment, The Railroad Crossing Law of Ohio, 15 OHio ST. L.J.
361 (1954), Comment, Extrahazardous Railroad Crossings, 7 BAYLOR L. Ray. 170 (1955),
Comment, Montana's Extra-Hazardous Railroad Crossings, 9 MONT. L. REv. 109 (1948).
19 Illinois Cent. R.R. v. House, 352 S.W.2d 819 (Ky. App. 1961).
20 Detroit, T. & I.R.R. v. Yeley, 165 F.2d 375 (6th Cir. 1947).
21 Icsman v. New York Cent. R.R., 85 Ohio App. 47, 87 N.E.2d 829 (1948).
22 Missouri-Kansas-Texas R.R. v. Beasley, 321 S.W.2d 938 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959).
23 Hicks v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 160 Ohio St. 307, 116 N.E.2d 307 '(1953).
24 See 36 Mo. L. REv. 586 (1971).
25 Yazvac v. Baltimore & O.R.R.. 342 F.Supp. 161 (W.D.Penn. 1972); Coleman v.
Chicago, B. & Q.R.R., 287 Ill. App. 483, 5 N.E.2d 103 (1936).
26 Adamson v. Midland Valley R.R., 384 F.2d 341 (10th Cir. 1967); Still v. Hampton
& B.R.R., 258 S.C. 416, 189 S.E. 15 '(1972); Van v. Union Pac. R.R., 83 Ida. 539, 366 P.2d
837 (1961).
27 Annot., 84 A.L.R.2d 813, 823 (1962).
28 Grand Trunk R.R. v. Ives, 144 U.S. 408 (1892).
29 Bledsoe v. Missouri K. & T.R.R., 149 Kan. 741, 90 P.2d 9 (1939).
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devices." Given the amount of traffic and the type of warning at a crossing, the
formula is used to compute the probable number of accidents per year. Greater
use of the formula has been hindered because its accuracy has not been prospec-
tively proven, and it ignores such variables as weather, darkness, and obstructions
near a track 1
To recover, the plaintiff must thus work his way through a maze of con-
flicting precedents and fine distinctions to establish the unusually hazardous
character of the crossing; he must do this to the satisfaction of the court before he
can reach the jury. The Supreme Court of Oregon reflected upon the effect of
the unusual hazard rule, saying:
The utility of railroads and the relative difficulty in controlling and maneu-
vering a train as compared with an automobile have caused the law to give
railroads a position of preference. It may be that the law will someday be
reevaluated in the light of changing conditions and values&32
III. The Trend Toward a Due Care Standard
Despite the tradition of the unusual hazard rule, recent cases indicate that
it is falling into disfavor. Recent decisions have employed three methods to
attack the unusual hazard rule in order to replace it with a standard of due care:
(1) distinguishing past cases, (2) overruling past cases, and (3) redefining
unusual hazards.
A. Distinguishing Past Cases: The California and Michigan Approach
California and Michigan have adopted the due care standard by noting
early decisions accepting the due care standard and holding that later cases
speaking of unusual hazards were misapplications of that rule. As early as 1943,
in Pen v. Los Angeles Junction Railway,"3 the California Supreme Court cited
the inconsistencies in past decisions and held that the proper standard was due
care.
The standard of care is that of the man of ordinary prudence under the
circumstances. The question of the negligence of the railroad operator is
ordinarily one of fact in crossing cases as it is in other negligence cases....
Too frequently appellate courts have ignored those fundamental principles
when dealing with railroad crossing accidents, and have arbitrarily sub-
stituted their conclusions of law as to the care a man of ordinary prudence
would exercise... ?4
30 Comment, Railroad Crossing Accidents, 4 GONZAGA L. Rav. 293, 299 (1969), citing
Peabody and Dimmick, Accident Hazard at Grade Crossings, Ratings Based Upon Railway and
Highway Traffic, Type of Protection, and Physical Characteristics, 22 PuBLic RoADs 123
(1941).
31 Senegal v. Thompson, 91 So. 2d 865 (La. App. 1956).
32 Sargent v. Southern Pac. Trans. Co.,-Or.-, 504 P.2d 729, 732 (1972).
33 22 Cal.2d 111, 137 P.2d 441 (1943).
34 Id. at 120, 137 P.2d at 446, cited with approval in Herrera v. Southern Pac. R.R.,
155 Cal. App. 2d 781, 785, 318 P.2d 784, 786 (1967).
NOTES
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
Later California decisions have affirmed the principle that "statutory regula-
tions constitute only the minimum measure of care required by the railroad, and
it is usually a matter for the jury to determine whether something more than the
minimum was required." 5
In 1964 Michigan joined California in adopting the due care formula. In
Emery v. Chesapeake & Ohio Railroad Company,"8 the trial judge had granted a
judgment for the railroad because of the plaintiff's failure to show special cir-
cumstances making the crossing unusually hazardous. In doing so he relied upon
a series of Michigan cases which has seemingly accepted the unusual hazard
rule. 7 On appeal, the Michigan Supreme Court began with an analysis of several
of the state's early railroad crossing cases, 8 and concluded that although it had
asserted the due care standard it had refused "more often than not to apply it,"
3 9
especially in the more recent cases. The court criticized the unusual hazard rule
as a rejection of sound common law principles, and as an encouragement to
usurpation of jury functions by judges.
Michigan has continued to apply the Emery test. In Erbel v. Saginaw Road
Commissioners," the trial court had instructed the jury that the railroad was
under no duty to provide extrastatutory warnings of its crossing and that it could
not be found negligent in not providing them unless the crossing were shown to
have been unusually hazardous. The Michigan Supreme Court said of the in-
structions:
We do not regard this as adequate or accurate.... The test is not whether
the conditions were unusually dangerous, but whether what was done under
the circumstances met the test of an ordinarily prudent man under the same
or similar circumstances. 41
Though the jury may still be instructed as to the railroad's compliance with
statutory requirements, such compliance merely constitutes the minimum of
care.2 No prior determination of unusual hazard is necessary for a jury to find
a railroad negligent for failure to provide warnings in addition to those required
by statute.
35 Pennington v. Southern Pac. Co., 146 Cal. App.2d 605, 613, 304 P.2d 22, 27 (1956).
See also Hogue v. Southern Pac. R.R., 1 Cal.3d 253, 81 Cal. Rptr. 765, 460 P.2d 965 (1969).
36 372 Mich. 663, 127 N.W.2d 826 (1964).
37 Walsh v. Grand Trunk Western R.R., 363 Mich. 522, 110 N.W.2d 799 (1961); Allen
v. Grand Trunk Western R.R., 334 Mich. 104, 53 N.W.2d 607 (1952); Esterline v. Kennicott,
277 Mich. 130, 268 N.W. 835 (1936); McParlan v. Grand Trunk Western R.R. 273 Mich.
527, 263 N.W. 734 (1935).
38 Barnum v. Grand Trunk Western R.R., 148 Mich. 370, 111 N.W. 1036 (1907);
Freeman v. Duluth S.S. & A.R.R., 74 Mich. 86, 41 N.W. 872 (1889); Guggenheim v. Lake
Shore & M.S.R.R., 66 Mich. 150, 33 N.W. 161 (1887); Staal v. Grand Rapids & I.R.R., 57
Mich. 239, 23 N.W. 795 (1885).
39 Emery v. Chesapeake & Ohio Railroad Company, 372 Mich. 663 at 673, 127 N.W.2d
at 831.
40 386 Mich. 598, 194 N.W.2d 365 (1972).
41 Id. at 605, 194 N.W.2d at 368.




B. Specific Overruling of Earlier Cases: The Oregon Approach
The Oregon Supreme Court adopted the due care test by directly overruling
a long series of prior cases adhering to the unusual hazard standard.43 In Koch
v. Southern Pacific Company,44 the plaintiff was a passenger in an automobile
which collided with defendant's train. The jury was instructed on the basis of
the unusual hazard rule. On appeal, the court acknowledged three defects in the
unusual hazard rule: (1) the encouragement given trial judges to encroach upon
jury functions, (2) the difficulty of administering the rule, and (3) the tendency
of the rule to unduly favor railroads.
The court concluded that railroad crossing cases should be treated under
the same standard of due care applied in other negligence cases. Instead of
holding automobile drivers to a standard of due care and railroads to an unusual
hazard standard, henceforth "the duty of both railroad and motorist should be
that of reasonable care under the attendant circumstances." 45
C. Redefining Unusual Hazards in Terms of Due
Care: The Kansas and Wisconsin Approach
In Sexsmith v. Union Pacific Railroad Company,4 the trial court judge
directed a verdict for the defendant railroad holding that the plaintiff had
not established that the crossing in question was unusually hazardous. The
Kansas Supreme Court reversed this decision, defining unusual hazards in terms
which are more consistent with the due care standard. The court said:
We... recognized the rule... that where unusually dangerous conditions
prevail at a railroad crossing the unusual hazard may make additional
warnings and precautions by the railroad company necessary. The crux of
the matter is simply whether the railroad has afforded users of the crossing
sufficient and adequate protection under the reasonably careful person
rule.47
In Kurz v. Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific Railroad Company,4"
the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that an approval of the railroad's crossing
by a public service commissioner would not preclude a finding of negligence
based on a failure to provide more adequate warnings where the crossing was
unusually hazardous. 9 In clarifying the standard, the court stated that, "An
'ultrahazardous crossing' is a relative term and simply means the hazards of the
railroad crossing demand more or better safety devices than it has.""0
43 The unusual hazard rule in Oregon is described in 20 OR. L. REv. 84 '(1940).
44 - Or.-, 513 P.2d 770 (1973).
45 Id. at 779.
46 209 Kan. 99, 495 P.2d 930 (1972).
47 Id. at 108, 495 P.2d at 937. Cited with approval in Jennings v. Missouri Pac. R.R.,
- Kan. -. 506 P.2d 1125 (1973).
48 53 Wis. 2d 12, 192 N.W.2d 97 (1971).
49 Since the commissioner merely approved the- railroad's plans for the crossing and did
not make an independent order to the railroad to take any action, the case is distinguishable
from Schulz v. Chicago M. St. P. & P. Ry., 260 Wis. 541, 51 N.W. 2d 542 (1952), and
Verrette v. Chicago & N.W.Ry., 40 Wis. 2d 20, 161 N.W.2d 264 (1968), where it was held
that obedience to a commissioner's order precluded a finding of negligence.
50 Kurz v. Chicago, M., St. P. & Pac. R.R., 53 Wis. 2d 12, 18, 192 N.W.2d 97, 102.
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The Wisconsin and Kansas cases demonstrate an erosion of the unusual
hazard standard and a tendency to return to the common law due care standard.
They are significant indications of the trend in railroad crossing cases back to
the due care rule."
IV. Conclusion
The unusual hazard rule is a peculiarity of railroad crossing cases which has
been used by courts to limit the liability of railroads by narrowing the power of
juries to find railroads negligent for not having provided warning devices not
required by statute.5 2 A growing number of states have expressed dissatisfaction
with the rule on the grounds that it is out of step with modem concepts of
responsibility and encourages judges to usurp functions." The trend in recent
cases has been to return to the common law standard of due care. Under this
standard, a finding of negligence can only be overturned where it is manifestly
against the weight of the evidence using the same tests applied by courts in other
negligence areas.5"
The trend to permit juries to find railroads negligent under the due care
test is in harmony with recent developments in other areas of tort law.55 Most
importantly, it reflects modem attitudes toward the standard of care expected of
railroads and motorists at crossings.
Ernest J. Szarwark
51 Statistics substantiate the growing trend of courts to permit questions regarding the
negligence of railroads to go to the jury. In cases involving cars colliding with trains which
were already at the crossing (see text accompanying notes 24-27 supra), the courts before
1946 directed verdicts against the plaintiff in about four-fifths of the decided cases, Anno.,
161 A.L.R. 111, 142 (1947). Since 1946 courts have so directed verdicts in only about half
of such cases, Anno., 84 A.L.R.2d 813, 823 (1962).
52 See text accompanying notes 13-17 supra.
53 See text accompanying notes 33-51 supra.
54 See Baldinger's Estate v. Ann Arbor R.R., 372 Mich. 685. 127 N.W.2d 837 '(1964).
55 See generally, Terry, Of Railroads-And Torts-And Trends, 16 DEFE-Nsn L. J. 1
(1967).
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